"McClellan was a habitual exaggerator, often times he misrepresented the force of Lee’s army by two or three times its actual strength (McPherson 123). He further exaggerated his army’s successes when, after he had found the rebel plans, he botched an early opportunity before Antietam to completely eliminate Lee’s forces... This failure allowed the bloodiest single day of fighting in American history to occur at Antietam, and despite having a numerical advantage, McClellan again did not pursue and refused to chase Lee into Virginia to strike what may have been the decisive blow (Oakes 314). Lincoln visited Antietam in early October to discuss pressing the attack and additionally urged McClellan via correspondence(two weeks before the October 25th letter) by listing the advantages he had over Lee. Almost read as a final plea, he mentioned that McClellan had better roads, an easier path, more soldiers, and sure victory on the horizon (Lincoln). McClellan did not bite and spent much of October encamped and static."